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Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of
perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms
of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities.
Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test
case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents,
we show how a quality space (QS) could be constructed relying on olfactory perceptible
properties and the olfactory mental qualities then deﬁned by appeal to that QS of olfactory
perceptible properties. We also consider how to delimit the olfactory QS from other
modalities.We further apply QST to the role that experience plays in reﬁning our olfactory
discriminative abilities and the occurrence of olfactory mental qualities in non-conscious
olfactory states. QST is shown to be fully applicable to and useful for understanding the
complex domain of olfaction.
Keywords: quality-space theory, quality-space, olfaction, mental qualities, phenomenology, perceptual qualities,
consciousness
QUALITY-SPACE THEORY
Conscious perceiving always subjectively involves conscious quali-
tative character. Conscious vision involves qualities of color and of
visible shape, size, and location; conscious audition involves quali-
ties of pitch, loudness, timbre, and audible location; and conscious
olfaction involves mental qualities that correspond to the various
odorants and, possibly, qualities that correspond to their locations.
Perceiving occurs not only consciously, but without being con-
scious as well, in masked priming and other forms of subliminal
perceiving (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Sobel et al., 1999; Breitmeyer and
Ög˘men, 2006; Ög˘men and Breitmeyer, 2006; Zucco et al., 2013).
In the conscious cases, we know about the qualitative character
of perceptual states subjectively, by how they appear to conscious-
ness. So many are tempted to conclude that when perceptual states
do occur without being conscious, there is no way to know about
their qualitative character, and hence no qualitative character in
that case to know about.
This line of thought has led many in philosophy to deny that
non-conscious perceptual states exhibit any qualitative charac-
ter, properly so called (e.g., Nagel, 1974). It has also led many
in philosophy to see the qualitative character of perceptual states
as deeply problematic. It has been argued that neural processes
cannot constitute or give rise to conscious qualitative character
(Chalmers, 1996), or that, if they can, we cannot in any case
explain how that can be (Levine, 2001). And it has been urged
that since we know about qualitative character only by way of
consciousness, i.e., only by ﬁrst-person access, the speciﬁc types
of mental quality that ﬁgure in perceiving a particular physical
property might differ from one individual to another in ways
that are empirically undetectable (e.g., Shoemaker, 1975/1984).
Carrying this to an extreme, it has been held that an individ-
ual that is physically indistinguishable from us and functions in
ways perceptually indistinguishable from us might nonetheless
lack conscious mental qualities (Chalmers, 1996). And many
not in philosophy have found these conclusions tempting as
well.
Concern with these apparent conundra has generated a large
literature in philosophy, with many arguing that these problems
cannot be sidestepped or resolved and others proposing solutions
that seldom gain lasting wide adherence. But both sides in this
debate typically operate on the assumption that since qualitative
character occurs only in conscious perceiving, that we can know
about qualitative character only by way of subjective, ﬁrst-person
access.
The demonstrable occurrence of perceiving that is not con-
scious forces reexamination of the assumption that subliminal
and other non-conscious perceiving is actually devoid of qual-
itative character, and that non-conscious perceiving discharges
its psychological and biological function without beneﬁt of men-
tal qualities. And any such reexamination shows that it is by no
means obvious that non-conscious perceiving lacks qualitative
character.
For one thing, we describe non-conscious perceptual states in
the same qualitative terms we use to taxonomize conscious per-
ceptual states. That is evident, for example, in experimental work
on masked priming. Participants visually but non-consciously
perceive stimuli in respect of their colors and shapes; we clas-
sify the non-conscious visual states in respect of those qualitative
terms despite those states’ not being conscious. More important,
it is clear in conscious perceiving that differences in qualitative
character are responsible for the discriminative ability charac-
teristic of perceiving; in conscious perceiving it is plain that we
would be unable to distinguish color, shapes, sounds, and odors
without our conscious perceptual states’ differing in qualitative
character in ways that make such discriminations possible. But
unconscious perceiving also enables the discrimination of various
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environmental properties, indeed largely the same discriminations
we make in conscious perceiving. In addition, when experimen-
tal participants guess about degraded stimuli (Cheesman and
Merikle, 1986; Merikle, 1992; Dienes and Seth, 2010), where guess-
ing taken to be an indication that the perceiving is not conscious,
they guess about colors and other qualitative character, indicat-
ing non-conscious qualitative states that reﬂect those qualitative
properties. So it is natural to infer that differences in qualitative
character in unconscious perceiving as well, enabling us to make
those discriminations.
Consider the visual case. Consciously seeing something red is
being in a visual state that is more like seeing orange than like
seeing blue or green; similarly, subliminally seeing something red
is being in just such a state, except the state is not conscious. With-
out some compelling independent reason, reserving the notion of
mental qualitative character for conscious states is an arbitrary and
unwarranted stipulation from a time when the occurrence of non-
conscious perceiving was not recognized. And as with empirical
and theoretical issues generally, we must rest with the strongest
considerations available to us.
The assumption that non-conscious perceiving lacks qualita-
tive character seems tempting only if one sees no way to learn
about and describe mental qualities except by how they subjec-
tively appear in consciousness. But it is worth stressing that appeal
to that assumption begs the question at hand. If unconscious per-
ceiving lacks qualitative character, then we will have access to
qualitative character primarily, and perhaps exclusively, by way
of consciousness. Some independent consideration is needed to
settle the issue about whether qualitative character ever occurs
without being conscious.
Quality-space theory (QST; Rosenthal, 1991, 1999, 2005, 2010,
in press; Clark, 1993) offers just such an independent reason. It
constructs an alternative to the exclusive reliance on subjective
consciousness, by explaining the nature of mental qualities by
appeal to their role in perceiving. Since perceiving can occur with-
out being conscious, QST provides an explanation of qualitative
character that applies to perceiving independent of whether it is
conscious, and hence without in any way relying on conscious
access to qualitative character.
The core idea of QST rests on the discriminative function of
perception mentioned above. Perceiving always involves discrim-
ination of properties accessible by a particular sensory modality.
And to discriminate two properties, p1 and p2, a creature must
be able to be in psychological state of two distinct types, each
type corresponding in some suitably differential way to one of the
two perceptible properties. The two types of perceptual state must
differ in respect of some psychologically relevant properties.
The conscious perceptual states that enable discrimination of
perceptible properties differ in respect of qualitative character. So
it is natural to identify as mental qualities the differential psy-
chological properties that enable discrimination of perceptible
properties, whether that discrimination occurs consciously or not.
Perceptual states enable discrimination of perceptible properties
by differing in respect of mental quality. Mental qualities are the
psychological properties in virtue of which a creature can distin-
guish among the various properties accessible to each perceptual
modality.
One can measure discriminative ability by testing for just-
noticeable differences (JNDs) between barely discriminable prop-
erties for a particular modality. Methodological issues arise
because discriminability is not transitive; p1 may be just notice-
ably different from p2and p2 from p3 even though p1 and p3 are
indistinguishable (e.g., Goodman, 1951). But despite that, one
can use JNDs to construct a quality space (QS) that represents all
the discriminations that a particular individual can make among
the perceptible properties accessible by a particular modality. The
dimensions of this space will emerge as needed; it may be that
though p1, p2, and p3 are just noticeably different in a linear
fashion, several other perceptible properties are just noticeably
different from each of p1, p2, and p3, in ways that induce a new
dimension for the QS of the perceptible properties accessible by
that modality (Clark, 1993, pp. 84–89).
The QSs constructed in this way describe discriminability of
the perceptible properties accessible by a particular modality.
But because mental qualities are the differential psychologi-
cal properties of states that enable such discriminations, the
very same space will also capture the differences and similar-
ities among those mental qualities. So that QS describes and
explains what mental qualities are, and how we taxonomize them
by type. And since the relevant discriminability among stim-
uli accessible by a particular modality occur in both conscious
and non-conscious perceiving, a QST account of mental quali-
ties is independent of how they present themselves subjectively to
consciousness.
Indeed, one can establish non-conscious JNDs. As noted ear-
lier, when stimuli are degraded, subjects’ JND judgments remain
accurate even when subjects take themselves to be merely guessing
(Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Merikle, 1992; Dienes and Seth,
2010). Since taking oneself to guess indicates that one is not con-
sciously aware of JNDs, it reﬂects perceptual states that are not
conscious.
The QS of perceptible properties matches that of the mental
qualities that enable discrimination among thoseperceptible prop-
erties. Onemight conclude that such amatch cannot be established
without subjective awareness of the relevant mental qualities, and
so QST cannot after all apply to non-conscious perceiving. This
is a mistake. The match between QSs is established not by com-
paring the space of discriminable perceptible properties with the
space of corresponding mental qualities. Rather, it is established
by extrapolating from the space of perceptible properties to that
of mental qualities. That extrapolation is an inference to the best
explanation of what makes possible the discriminations used to
construct the QS of perceptible properties.
Constructing QSs using discriminative abilities does not appeal
to normal or typical conditions of perceiving. JNDs are used to
construct the QS of perceptible properties; so optimal conditions
for each individual tested are what matter. Moreover, the QS of
perceptible properties will not in general reﬂect the physical prop-
erties of the stimuli, since the space is constructed not by appeal
to the physical nature of the stimuli, but to how an individual
discriminates among them.
A dramatic case of this occurs with color, where there are
different wavelength distributions that are perceptually indistin-
guishable. So on QST, these different wavelength distributions
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result in the same mental qualities. If the space that determined
mental qualities were constructed from the physical properties of
stimuli, such stimuli would determine distinct mental qualities.
On a space of perceptible properties constructed from discrim-
inability, as determined by JNDs, these stimuli occupy identical
positions, and so determine identical mental qualities. But it
is important that this kind of phenomenon apart, perceptible
properties are grouped for purposes of QST not by appeal to
their physical characteristics, but by the ability of perceivers to
discriminate among them.
Perceptual acuity can differ not only between individuals but
alsowithin an individual over time. Perceptual acuity can improve,
e.g., by perceptual learning or maturation, which results in an
enhanced or more ﬁne-grained space of discriminable stimuli,
and a correspondingly enlarged or more ﬁne-grained space of
mental qualities. And though one tests individuals, averaging over
members of a species will capture average discriminability for that
species. There are other reﬁnements (Rosenthal, 2005, ch. 7, 2010,
in press), but these will not bear on our purposes here.
Each stimulus type an individual can discriminate from its
neighbors is physically distinct from other stimuli; so it is describ-
able on its own, independent of any others. But because the QS
of perceptible properties is constructed from the discriminability
relations that JNDs deliver, the locations in the space of all the per-
ceptible properties is determined relative to the location of other
perceptible properties.
No perceptible property has a ﬁxed position independent of
its discriminability relations to the others. The space is not con-
structed by ﬁrst having some ﬁxed locations for some privileged
perceptible properties and locating others relative to them; it
is constructed by determining the relations of discriminability
among all the properties accessible by a particular modality. So
the theory represents each type of perceptible property compar-
atively, by appeal to which other properties it is discriminable
from. And QST accordingly also represents each type of men-
tal quality comparatively, by appeal to relative discriminability of
stimuli.
By contrast, theories that explain the nature of mental qualities
by appeal to the way they subjectively appear in consciousness
result in a non-comparative, non-relational taxonomy of the types
of mental quality, typing each independently of all others. Relying
on ﬁrst-person, subjective access to mental qualities tends to result
in a non-comparative taxonomy, since consciousness by itself can
access only the token mental qualities, independent of how they
are typed. Having picked out token mental qualities, subjective
awareness can then compare them; but subjective awareness must
on such an account be able to individuate token mental qualities
independent of any such comparisons.
It is this feature of the reliance on consciousness in explaining
what mental qualities are that makes it appealing to imagine that
one person’s mental quality on seeing a red stimulus could unde-
tectably be the same as another person’s on seeing a green stimulus.
If ﬁrst-person access could trump everything else we know about
mental qualities, there would be no way to exclude that strange
apparent possibility.
QST, by contrast, precludes such undetectable inversion. The
QS for every known perceptual modality is asymmetric (see, e.g.,
Kuehni, 1998, 2003, ch. 6, 2005, ch. 6; Ramanath et al., 2004). Even
the one-dimensional space of grayscale shades is asymmetric, due
to the anchoring effect in which the lightest shade in any local
framework appears to be pure while (Gilchrist, 2006). And though
sufﬁciently detailed work on the discriminability space of other
perceptible properties has not been done, there is no reason to
expect that the resulting QSs will turn out in any such case to be
symmetrical.
The mental qualities that pertain to visible colors are a useful
initial test case forQST,partly because thedimensions of theQSare
few in number andwell understood, and partly because color plays
such a prominent role in our conscious experience. Individuals
discriminate among colors along various dimensions, which turn
out to correspond to the standard properties of hue, saturation,
and brightness. When individuals are tested for discrimination of
neighboring color stimuli, it turns out that these are dimensions
that emerge, resulting in a three-dimensional QS of discriminable
color properties (e.g., CIE, 1932; Clark, 1993).
QST builds from a QS of perceptible colors, and extrapolates
to determine the various types of mental color quality in terms of
their relative location in a QS isomorphic to that of the perceptible
colors. But it may be tempting to suppose that there are after all
perceptual primitives for color, ﬁxed not comparatively as in QST,
but in an absolute, non-comparative way.
Focusing on how we consciously perceive things makes it
inviting to posit perceptual primitives that operate in a non-
comparative way. Subjective awareness of mental color qualities
makes it seem that each of the colors is what it is just on its own,
and not as a function of relations with others. Consciousness can
compare the various mental color qualities, but only by treating
each as independently ﬁxed. So subjective consciousness cannot
represent the mental qualities as ﬁxed in a comparative, relational
way.
But since perceiving also occurs without being conscious, if
there were perceptual primitives, they would be common to con-
scious and non-conscious perceiving. So the way consciousness
represents mental qualities cannot by itself ground the positing of
perceptual primitives. The JNDs used to construct QSs, by con-
trast, ﬁx perceptible properties by relative discriminability and
hence comparatively; the corresponding mental qualities follow
suit.
One might argue that a comparative taxonomy of mental quali-
ties cannot be correct if subjective awareness does not present them
comparatively. But it is far from obvious that subjective awareness
does present mental qualities non-comparatively. We have sub-
jective access to each token mental color quality, for example, in
respect of its comparative location in our ﬁeld of vision, as ﬁxed
by the boundaries of that ﬁeld, beyond which there are no more
mental color qualities.
Consciousness aside, however, perhaps the relevant neural
machinery ﬁxes some perceptual primitives in an absolute, non-
comparative way. In color vision, appeal to opponent-processing
theory (Hurvich and Jameson, 1957) may seem to underwrite
suchperceptual primitives. Onopponent-processing theory, chan-
nels in the optic nerve code retinal color information as relative
strengths of opponent colors, red vs. green, blue vs. yellow, and
black vs. white.
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But even if the opponent-processing hypothesis is correct, it
would not undermine QST, which seeks to explain not the mech-
anisms of perceiving, but the qualitative character of perceptual
states that such perceptual machinery subserves. And the mental
qualities distinctive of each modality are a matter of the discrim-
inative ability that the perceptual apparatus, whatever it may be,
enables; they are properties of perceptual states in virtue of which
an individual can discriminate instances of a range of percepti-
ble properties. Even if particular types of stimulus are especially
salient for the perceptual apparatus of a particular modality, such
perceptual primitives do not ﬁgure in ﬁxing the types of mental
quality for that modality.
There is a striking illustration of how mental qualities may
depart from what underlying perceptual mechanisms seem to dic-
tate. On opponent-processing theory, seeing red and seeing green
each result from outweighing the opponent color in the red–green
channel; similarly for blue and yellow. So the theory should pre-
clude so-called forbidden colors, such as reddish green and as
yellowish blue.
But image stabilization, in which a retinal image is made to
hold constant despite saccading, can produce cortical ﬁlling in
that leads subjects presented with adjacent red and green stripes
to report seeing reddish green; similarly for yellow and blue (Crane
and Piantanida, 1983; Billock et al., 2001). These ﬁndings do not
undermine opponent-processing theory, since opponent process-
ingwould occur in optic-nerve channels prior to the cortical ﬁlling
in that results in these subjective experiences. But they do show
that individuation of mental-quality types is not settled by appeal
to underlying perceptual mechanisms. The typing of mental qual-
ities rests on discriminability of one perceptible property from
another.
Colors are not the only perceptible properties accessible by
vision; vision also represents spatial properties of size, shape,
and location. It captures these spatial properties as boundaries of
discriminable colors; without discriminable differences in color,
including the achromatic colors (black, gray, white), vision could
not access size, shape, or location. And as just noted, some retinal
motion relative to visual stimuli is needed for the normal visual
perception of spatial boundaries, i.e., visible sizes, shapes, and
locations QST handles the spatial mental qualities as it does other
mental qualities. One can test for JNDs of visible shapes, sizes, and
locations, and collate the results in QSs of those visible properties.
And since mental qualities are the properties of perceptual states
that enable perceptual discrimination, the QSs of visible shapes,
sizes, and locations also determine the mental visual qualities of
shapes, sizes, and locations (Meehan, 2001; Rosenthal, 2001, in
press).
Perceptible objects have sizes, shapes, and locations indepen-
dent of being perceived, and hence independent of the modality
by which those spatial properties are perceived. But the mental
qualities that pertain to these spatial perceptible properties are
tied to particular modalities. Vision accesses the physical location
of things, e.g., by boundaries of discriminable colors, tactition by
discriminable resistance, pressure (Kappers and Bergmann Tiest,
2013), and texture, and audition by stereo effects of discriminable
sounds. So distinct testing of JNDs is needed to establish QSs that
capture the spatial perceptible properties discriminable by each
modality, and those distinct QSs will in turn then ﬁx the spatial
mental qualities for each modality.
QST ﬁxes the mental qualities of both conscious and non-
conscious perception. So the theory cannot by itself explain how
conscious perceiving differs from perceiving that is not conscious;
an additional theory is needed to do that. If an individual is in a
mental state of some type but is wholly unaware of being in that
state, that shows that the state is not conscious; this test dominates
work in experimental psychology and aswell as our common sense
views about conscious states. So a state is conscious only if the indi-
vidual is aware of it in some suitable way. A successful explanation
of what is distinctive of conscious perceiving differs will doubtless
proceed along such lines (Rosenthal, 2004, 2005).
Since QST is not a theory of the difference between conscious
and non-conscious states, the main theories of consciousness are
not in direct competition with QST. Indeed, there are few if any
theories that competewithQST indirectly addressing thenature of
mental qualities, as against mental representation more generally.
The main alternative views are those that hold that our knowledge
about qualitative character is limited to what subjective awareness
reveals (e.g., Nagel, 1974; Kripke, 1980; Block, 1995; Chalmers,
1996; Levine, 2001). For further extended arguments against
these views and their variants (see Rosenthal, 2010), which also
advances compelling general considerations to think that QST is
correct.
In this paper we do not attempt a comprehensive review of
QST and the competing theories. Instead, we want to test if QST
can deal with the challenges that olfaction presents. Each modality
may raise its own issues about the dimensions of the relevant QSs,
the possibility of perceptual primitives, the contrast between QST
and an exclusively ﬁrst-person, consciousness-based approach to
mental qualities, the nature of mental qualities if any that occur
in connection with spatial perception, and others. Here we use
olfaction as an especially challenging test case for the theory.
THE OLFACTORY QUALITY SPACE
The color QS based on JNDs is well-established. However, in other
modalities much less progress has been made. We are, for example,
not aware of any attempt to construct an olfactory QS based on
JNDs. Furthermore, so far all attempts to arrange olfactory qual-
ities based on other aspects of perception have failed (Berglund
and Höglund, 2012; Kaeppler and Mueller, 2013), casting some
doubt on whether there is any olfactory QS analogous to the color
QS. However, there are good reasons to believe that there is such
an olfactory QS and that the reason why it has not been described
yet is that it is much more complex than the three-dimensional
color QS.
Most attempts to establish an odor QS have been attempts
to arrange individual odorous molecules (benzaldehyde, hexanal,
vanillin, and so on) in a perceptual space based on the similarities
in their perceived smell (Wise et al., 2000). Such a space would
only cover a very small fraction of all olfactory qualities because
mixtures of odorous molecules frequently have qualities that are
different from the qualities of its components. No two mixtures of
different odorous molecules that are perceptually indistinguish-
able have so far been identiﬁed. Furthermore, the use of a small
number of odorous stimuli may reﬂect the idea that there are some
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perceptual primitives, which runs counter to the methodology of
QST.
Because of the unique perceptual properties of each mixture,
there is no easy way to use the space of the perceived qualities
of individual odorous molecules as a basis to construct an olfac-
tory QS that includes all olfactory qualities, including those found
only in mixtures. The space of the perceived olfactory qualities of
molecules would have to have the feature that no line connect-
ing the perceptual qualities of two molecules crosses another such
line (as this would be a case of two mixtures that are perceptually
indistinguishable).
To construct an olfactory QS that covers all olfactory percep-
tual qualities, one has therefore to include the olfactory qualities of
mixtures, which are also the qualities we are familiar with because
the smells encountered in nature are almost always mixtures. The
characteristic scent of a rose, for example, is produced by amixture
of 275 different odorous molecules (Ohloff, 1994, pp. 154–158).
An olfactory QS of odor mixtures can be constructed based on
JNDs by gradually altering the ratios of the components of one
mixture until it becomes an olfactory stimulus distinguishable
from the original.
It is easy to see that the QS constructed in this way would have
to accommodate a very large number of distinguishable olfac-
tory sensory qualities. There are 166 billion molecules with 17
or less atoms (Ruddigkeit et al., 2012) and a large majority of
those that have been studied have an odor. Almost all these odor-
ous molecules have a smell that can be distinguished from the
smell of all other odorousmolecules (Laska andTeubner, 1999a,b).
The only instances of two different odorous molecules that have
indistinguishable smells are certain pairs of enantiomers (mirror-
symmetric molecules; Laska and Teubner, 1999b; Laska, 2004)
and some pairs of molecules that differ only in that the hydrogen
atomshave been replaced bydeuteriumatoms (Keller andVosshall,
2004). Other pairs of enantiomers and pairs of molecules that dif-
fer only in hydrogen isotopes can be distinguished (Laska and
Teubner, 1999b; Laska, 2004; Gane et al., 2013).
Odorous molecules can also be mixed in different combina-
tions and ratios, further increasing the large number of possible
olfactory stimuli. Only a very small fraction of these mix-
tures has ever been studied, but the fact that among those
mixtures that have been studied there are none that are indis-
tinguishable from others shows that many mixtures have unique
olfactory qualities, and so would occupy a distinct locution in an
olfactory QS.
On the other hand, there is independent reason to believe
that not all mixtures have a unique smell. In one of the most
signiﬁcant recent discoveries in olfactory psychophysics, Tali
Weiss and colleagues showed that mixtures with many compo-
nents converge perceptually. This means that mixtures of random
odorous molecules with a large enough number of components
smell similar and share an olfactory quality that has been called
“olfactory white” (Weiss et al., 2012). The reason why the com-
plex mixtures of odorous molecules that we encounter when
we smell roses or coffee do not smell similar is because the
components of these mixtures are not a random sampling of
odorous molecules and because in these naturally occurring mix-
tures there are some components represented at much higher
intensity than the majority of the components. How many
components are necessary in mixtures to render them indistin-
guishable from one another is not yet known, but on average,
mixtures of 30 or 60 components can still be discriminated
(Weiss et al., 2012).
These considerations suggest that there are very many percep-
tible properties in the olfactory modality that can be distinguished
by human subjects, and consequently very many olfactory mental
qualities that we must posit as responsible for such ﬁne-grained
olfactory discriminability ability. One thousand different odorous
molecules can be mixed into 3e+23 different mixtures of 10 com-
ponents. Even if each of those mixtures had the same smell as,
on average, one trillion other mixtures, there would be 3e+11 dif-
ferent olfactory qualities. In comparison, there are approximately
340,000 tones (Stevens and Davis, 1938) and between 2.3 and 7.5
million colors (Nickerson andNewhall, 1943; Pointer andAttridge,
1998) that humans can distinguish.
From a biological perspective it would not be surprising if there
were many more distinguishable odors than distinguishable col-
ors. Color perception ismediated by differential activation of three
different types of receptor whereas olfactory perception is medi-
ated by differential activation of around 400 different types of
receptors (Olender et al., 2012) and the possible combinations of
400 far exceed the possible combinations of three.
However, it is an interesting question how such a large num-
ber of perceptual qualities might be arranged into a QS. The two
mathematical solutions to this problem, which are not mutu-
ally exclusive, are that the resolution along the dimensions of
the space is very high or that there is a large number of dimen-
sions in the olfactory QS. QSs are mathematical constructs that
have whatever number of dimensions is needed to capture the
discriminability relations of the relevant stimuli and the cor-
responding mental qualities. The QS for thermosensation for
example seems to be one-dimensionality, along a dimension from
cold to hot. Interestingly, this is so despite the fact that several
types of receptors contribute to temperature sensation (Dhaka
et al., 2006). The fact that the activity of several receptor types
can result in a one-dimensional QS illustrates dramatically that
QSs are not based the sensitivity of receptor types, but on JNDs.
The color QS, like physical space, has three dimensions (hue,
saturation, and brightness; Hilbert and Kalderon, 2000). That
there are also three types of color receptors is a coincidence
and irrelevant for the construction of the color QS. It has been
suggested that the olfactory QS has a much higher dimensional-
ity than QSs in other modalities (Berglund and Höglund, 2012;
Auffarth, 2013).
It simply is not possible to arrange all olfactory qualities in
a low-dimensional space. Qualities of odor mixtures (at least in
most cases) are intermediary between the odor qualities of their
components; the perceptual qualities of mixtures occupy the space
delimited by their components in the QS (Wise and Cain, 2000;
Berglund and Höglund, 2012). Two odorous molecules and all
their mixtures ﬁll a one-dimensional QS. Four molecules and
their mixtures ﬁll a two-dimensional QS, eight molecules and
their mixtures a three-dimensional QS with the eight compo-
nents of the mixture in the corners of a cube. To accommodate
1,000 odorous molecules and all their mixtures, approximately 10
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dimensions would be required. To accommodate 100,000 odorous
molecules and their mixtures, one would need a 17-dimensional
space.
These considerations show that despite the failure of all previ-
ous attempts to do so, there is no reason to suppose that there is not
an olfactory QS that is based on JNDs and methodologically on a
par with the color QS. The difference between the two QSs is that
the olfactoryQS is larger andmore complex than the colorQS. The
color QS arranges a few million qualities in a three-dimensional
space whereas the olfactory QS arranges vastly more qualities in
a substantially higher-dimensional space. The numerous failures
to describe an olfactory QS are merely due to the extremely large
dataset required to do so.
THE OLFACTORY MODALITY
The odor QS represents olfactory qualities and the color QS repre-
sents color qualities, but how do we know which mental qualities
are part of the color QS and which are part of the odor QS? Tra-
ditionally, sense modalities have been individuated by criteria, but
there has been dispute over which criteria to use. The four main
approaches current in the philosophical literature are to use a rep-
resentational criterion, the phenomenal character criterion, the
proximal stimulus criterion, or the sense-organ criterion (Grice,
1962; Macpherson, 2011). We will here discuss an alternative way
of individuating modalities that does not depend on criteria, but
instead individuates modalities based on the results of forced-
choice discrimination tasks, the same methodology which is used
to construct QSs.
The traditional criterion-based approaches largely agree in how
they individuate vision and audition. However, with othermodali-
ties they often produce contradictory results. There is, for example,
a type of molecular receptor (called TRPV1) that is sensitive both
to hot temperature and to capsaicin, the pungent chemical found
in chili peppers (Caterina et al., 1997). If the sensory-organ cri-
terion is applied, capsaicin and heat are two stimuli in the same
modality. If the stimulus criterion is applied, then the TRPV1
receptor mediates perception in two different modalities. Two
stimuli that are sensed by the samemolecular receptorwill result in
the same neuronal activity and therefore in the same phenomenal
character; but the phenomenal-character criterion would judge
heat and capsaicin to be two stimuli in the same modality. How-
ever, what is represented by the stimuli is a botanical compound in
one case and temperature in the other. There are other examples of
receptors that are sensitive to different types of stimuli for which
the same analysis applies (Dhaka et al., 2006).
Since the four criterion-based approaches come to contradic-
tory results outside of vision and audition, they cannot all be
correct and philosophers have argued over which approach is
the correct one. Instead of contributing to this debate, we will
introduce here an alternative to criterion-based modality indi-
viduation. We propose to individuate modalities using the same
type of behavioral tests used to construct QSs: forced-choice dis-
crimination tasks. Suppose you have two stimuli. What you want
is to see whether the two can be manipulated (altered gradu-
ally so as to be more similar) so that in the end they are JND,
and then make them a bit more similar so that they come to be
totally indistinguishable. If so, then the two original stimuli are
accessible by the same modality. If they cannot be made JND
and then made to match, then they were not the same modality
to begin with. This appeals to discriminative responses to stim-
uli made problematic by, e.g., the TRPV1 receptor; it is not an
appeal to the physical nature of the stimuli themselves. Since
capsaicin cannot be gradually altered to turn into heat, TRPV1
mediates perception in two different modalities according to the
JND-method.
The JND-method allows individuating senses sensitive to light,
sound, temperature, pressure, magnetic ﬁeld, and electric ﬁeld.
What all these stimuli have in common is that they can be grad-
ually altered by arbitrarily small steps, thereby providing a basis
for the JND-method. Most stimulus types represent a continuum
like wavelength or temperature that is amenable to this treatment.
Chemical stimuli may seem to be an exception because chemical
stimuli consist of discrete molecules. Molecules cannot be altered
by arbitrarily small steps, instead, the smallest gradual change to
a molecule is to add or remove one atom or to replace one atom
with a similar atom. In almost all cases, a molecule can be dis-
tinguished by smell from the chemically most similar molecule
(Laska and Teubner, 1999a,b). However, as discussed in detail in
the above section on constructing the olfactory QS, the olfactory
stimulus space consists predominantly of mixtures of molecules
and the ratios of the components of a mixture can be altered in
arbitrarily small steps. Two odorous molecules A and B are con-
nected by JND steps through mixtures of A and B with different
ratios of the two components. The JND-method of modality indi-
viduation can therefore also be applied to the chemical senses
much in the same way in which it can be applied to all other
senses.
It has to be pointed out, however, that applying the JND-
method of modality individuation requires a prior decision on
what stimuli to include as components of mixtures. If one allows
mixing of, for example vanillin (a tasteless odorant) and sugar
(an odorless tastant), then odor and taste will be individuated
as a single modality by the JND-method, if, as can be expected,
orally administeredmixtures of vanillin and sugar can be gradually
altered from pure vanillin to pure sugar along a line of indistin-
guishable mixtures of different ratios. If one prevents mixing of
tastants and odorants then odor and taste will be individuated
as two modalities. If chemical stimuli are allowed to be mixed
with touch and temperature stimuli inside the oral cavity, the
JND-method will individuate the multisensory modality called
“ﬂavor” (Taylor and Roberts, 2004; Shepherd, 2011; Small and
Green, 2012).
In summary, when the JND-method of modality individuation
is applied, the samemethod that is used to constructingQSs can be
used to individuate modalities. This approach, which individuates
modalities through behavioral tests, provides an empirical alterna-
tive to the traditional criterion-based approaches. It can be readily
applied to senses sensitive to continuous stimuli like light, sound,
temperature, pressure, magnetic ﬁeld, and electric ﬁeld. To apply
it to the chemical senses, it has to be supplemented by a limit on
the stimuli that can be mixed. JNDs ﬁx the mental qualities specif-
ically and exclusively by appeal to the perceptual role that states
with those mental qualities play, independent of whether the states
are conscious states. So if we are to ﬁnd a supplement to JNDs that
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puts limits on the mixing of stimuli for purposes of construct-
ing the relevant QS, we would want to explore possibilities that
appeal in one way or another to the perceptual role of states with
the relevant mental qualities, independent of whether those states
are conscious. Any such supplement to JNDs would conform the
spirit of QST.
Because the JND method of modality individuation requires
behavioral experiments, the outcome of applying this method
is at this point speculative. It therefore remains to be seen how
the outcome of this approach compares to the outcomes of the
criterion-based approaches. However, regardless of the results, the
JND method has two advantages over the traditional approaches.
First, the same method that is used to individuate the senses is
used to construct QSs of the perceptual qualities in the indi-
vidual senses. This is an elegant way of arranging all sensory
qualities in just a single step. Second, the JND method is based
on an empirical procedure and it is therefore transferable to any
situation. Unusual senses (echolocation, polarized light, tactile
vision, etc.) or unusual subjects (aliens, synesthetes, etc.) that
often require special treatment by the criterion-based approaches
therefore poseno special problem for the JND-methodof modality
individuation.
How a modality is individuated has, of course, important con-
sequences for the features attributed to it. For example, how
olfaction is individuated determines whether it exhibits a spatial
aspect, perhaps calling for an independent QS that speciﬁcally
determines olfactory spatial mental qualities. It is commonly
thought that smells seemingly just appear within our nostrils or
as undifferentiated transparent odorous clouds within our sur-
roundings. This has a led a large number of philosophers to argue
that olfactory perception does not represent the location or direc-
tion of olfactory stimuli (Lycan, 2000; Smith, 2002; Matthen, 2007;
Peacocke, 2008; Batty, 2010). Almost all odors activate at suitable
concentrations both the ﬁrst cranial nerve (the olfactory nerve)
and the nerve endings of the ﬁfth cranial nerve (trigeminal nerve)
in the nasal cavity (Doty and Cometto-Muñiz, 2003). What types
of spatial aspects olfaction exhibits depends on whether what is
mediated by the trigeminal nerve is considered to belong to the
olfactory modality.
Even if one considers olfaction to be only what is mediated by
the olfactory nerve, these philosophers may be mistaken. Humans
can locate a smell using differences in concentration. Locating the
source of a smell requires active exploration; movement of the
whole body or at least of the head (Richardson, 2011). In this
respect, locating an odor source is similar to locating a heat source
(Smith, 2002). Olfactory experience can, across time (diachron-
ically), have spatial structure, although it can be debated if this
structure is represented in perception or cognitive. At any par-
ticular time (synchronically), olfactory experience has no spatial
structure.
If one individuates modalities in a way so that the trigeminal
nerve contributes to the olfactory percept (as the JND method
does), then olfaction also presents us synchronically with spatial
properties, in a similar fashion to audition, in which compar-
isons between the inputs into the two ears supports locating
sound sources. Although it has been shown that for stimuli
that activate only the olfactory nerve subjects cannot tell if the
odor is in the left or right nostril (Radil and Wysocki, 1998;
Frasnelli et al., 2008), this is easily possible for stimuli that acti-
vate the olfactory and the trigeminal nerve (Kleemann et al.,
2009). This enables us to determine the location of the odor
source because there are small differences in timing and inten-
sity of the stimulus between the two nostrils that enable us
to locate odorants within 7–10 degree of their location (von
Bekesy, 1964). Further evidence supporting the claim that each
nostril creates a different olfactory percept is substantiated by
Zucco and Chen (2009, p. 1564), who demonstrate that binau-
ral rivalry exists between the nostrils, such that “alternating odor
percepts [occur] when two different odorants are presented to
the two nostrils.” The difference between the perceptible prop-
erties presented to each nostril has also been shown to allow us
to track an olfactory stimulus through an environment over time
(Porter et al., 2007).
Thus, whatever the QS may be for olfactory qualities, the spa-
tial perceptible properties of olfaction will require an additional
QS dedicated speciﬁcally to reﬂect the JNDs of spatial location
of olfactory perceptible properties. Olfaction does present spa-
tial perceptible properties that can be ascertained in accordance
with JND judgments. The percept mediated by the olfactory nerve
does so diachronically and the percept mediate by the trigeminal
nerve synchronically. Those who deny any spatial aspect to olfac-
tory experience are simply mistaken. Olfactory perception does
present objects with perceptible spatial properties, but they are
diffused across the environment in a manner that is dissimilar to
the way the spatial aspects of objects are presented to vision. Odors
have spatiotemporal perceptible properties, yet locatedness might
not be a perceptible olfactory property that makes it unlike vision.
Whatever the case about spatial aspects of olfaction, however, there
is no conﬂict with QST, since the theory allows for different types
of QS for different modalities in general, and so also in respect of
spatial properties.
EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT OLFACTION
As noted in the introductory section on QST, the theory predicts
that the space of mental qualities is enhanced or made more ﬁne-
grained by improvements in perceptual acuity. The acuity of our
perceptual discriminations themselves, independent of conscious
awareness, can improve either through maturation of the percep-
tual system itself or by way of perceptual learning. These processes
lead to an enlargement or more ﬁne-grained development of the
QS, and enable us tomake a greater number of perceptual discrim-
inations. And QST posits that the ability to make more perceptual
discriminations is due to the occurrence of a correspondingly
greater number of mental qualities.
In this section we explore what is currently known about the
processes by which olfactory acuity is improved through per-
ceptual learning in application to QST. The evidence surveyed
discounts the role of maturation, but supports the claim that the
enhancement of perceptual acuity need not depend upon or even
be accompanied by, consciousness or subjective awareness. Our
subjective awareness of the contents of perception might well,
sometimes at least, be modulated and even enhanced by our con-
ceptual repertoire and descriptive resources, since we can often
report on more nuanced aspects of our experiences as we acquire
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more ﬁne-grained conceptual resources. But since QST deﬁnes
the mental qualities independent of subjective awareness of them,
the enhanced ability to report arguably reﬂects only subjective
awareness of the qualities, and not the mental qualities them-
selves (e.g., Rosenthal, 2005, p. 187). In what follows we show that
these claims are perfectly in keeping with what is known about
experience-dependent olfaction based on the studies survey below
that enhanced olfactory acuity need not depend upon subjective
awareness or an increase in conceptual repertoire and descriptive
resources.
There is some indication that enhanced perceptual acuity in
olfaction supports the claim by QST that an enhancement of the
QS independent of any subjective awareness can enhance our dis-
criminative abilities. An increased presentation of an odorant even
subliminally can generate further olfactory abilities for detect-
ing and discriminating that stimulus from others. Wysocki et al.
(1989) demonstrated that merely increasing the presentation of a
stimulus enables a subject to gain the ability to detect and discrim-
inate an odorant they were previously unable to smell at all. Thus,
increased exposure to an odorant that one could not subjectively
report smelling yielded a larger QS and thereby enhanced percep-
tual acuity in detecting and discriminating the odorant that is in
keeping with the evidence, about to be surveyed below, from the
enhanced perceptual acuity of perfume workers and the sensory
training of wine experts.
Olfactory acuity is not always enhanced by the number of expe-
riences one undergoes or by increased exposure to an odorant.
Indeed, a subject’s ability to discriminate between odorants can be
adversely effected by increased exposure to the binary mixture of
these odorants, such that familiaritywith themixture decreases the
subject’s ability to discriminate the components odorants (Case
et al., 2004). These resultsmight be attributed to so-called acquired
equivalence, in which two odors that are judged similar and that
frequently co-occur become increasingly difﬁcult to discriminate
(Stevenson and Boakes, 2003). Acquired equivalence is of rele-
vance toQST, since it suggests a reduction in thenumber of distinct
olfactory mental qualities resulting from decreased ability to dis-
criminate odorant stimuli. This arguably shows that not only does
improvement in perceptual acuity lead to an enhanced QS of men-
tal qualities, but a decrease in discriminative perceptual abilities
is reﬂected in a reduction in the ﬁneness of grain of the QS of
olfactory mental qualities.
Olfaction that is inﬂuenced by experience is especially fascinat-
ing with regards to QST claims regarding enhanced perceptual
acuity, since linguistic tags and semantic resources are known
to play only a limited role in improving olfactory acuity. Olfac-
tory perception and discriminative ability are enhanced primarily
through an increased number of stimulus presentations and
olfactory experiences, and linguistic tags and linguistic resources
for describing olfactory experiences play only a limited role in
improving olfactory discriminative ability. This ﬁts well with
QST, which deﬁnes mental qualities independent of subjective
awareness; linguistic tags and descriptive resources would pre-
sumably enhance only the subjective awareness of the olfactory
mental qualities, and not the mental qualities themselves, which
are ﬁxed just by discriminative ability independent of subjective
awareness.
However, it should be noted that in what follows none of the
studies surveyed below employed forced-choice discrimination
tasks using subliminal stimuli. Thus, their results do not directly
bear on the claim by QST that mental qualities are determined
according to judgments of JND that can occur independent of
conscious awareness of stimuli. Rather, the literature below on
consciously mediated enhanced olfactory perceptual acuity is sur-
veyed below for the sake of completeness. Furthermore, these
studies are instructive as it is arguable that if in adult testing
conscious olfactory acuity is only slightly inﬂuenced by linguis-
tic tags and semantic resources, then the same should hold for
non-conscious olfactory acuity. Additional research needs to be
conducted to conﬁrm that conclusion, by examining whether
these same results do occur in the discrimination of subliminally
presented olfactory stimuli.
The process of maturation is unlikely to be a major inﬂu-
ence in the increased ﬁneness of grain of olfactory perceptual
acuity, since the olfactory QS is relatively consistent from age
three through old age. The olfactory system is fully developed
and functional in utero and is responsible for an infant’s abil-
ity to identify its mother (Russell, 1976; Porter and Winberg,
1999), as well as the ability to distinguish relatives from strangers
(Porter et al., 1986). Children’s olfactory capacities are fully devel-
oped by age three in terms of odorant detection threshold and
hedonic judgments (Stein et al., 1958; Steiner, 1977; Schmidt
and Beauchamp, 1988; Schmidt, 1992; Soussignan et al., 1997).
There is some difference in detection thresholds, but this is most
likely due to adaptation to ecologically important stimuli. Fur-
thermore, while some studies have shown that children’s ability
for odor recognition and identiﬁcation is inferior to that of
adults, when linguistic competence and overall vocabulary are
controlled for, these apparent differences disappear (Schmidt and
Beauchamp, 1988; Lehrner et al., 1999). And though matura-
tion does not enhance acuity, deterioration does play a role in
the loss of olfactory perceptual acuity starting at about age 40
(Dulay et al., 2008).
Conscious perception is doubtlessly inﬂuenced by our con-
ceptual abilities and linguistic practices that enable us to utilize
vocabulary to describe perceptible properties. Conscious olfac-
tory perceptual acuity is inﬂuenced by verbal mediation in terms
of learned linguistic tags, but also to a large extent by the num-
ber of exposures to an odorant. In a classic set of experiments,
Rabin (1988) demonstrated that increased exposure to an odor-
ant improved the subject’s ability to discriminate that odor from
others. In the ﬁrst experiment the exposure condition showed
an increase discriminative ability as compared to the control, yet
the subjects in a further condition in which they learned relevant
linguistic tags showed an even greater increase in discriminative
ability. The results from the second experiment partially address
this by demonstrating that the familiarity of an odorant allowed an
enhanced discriminative capacity for similar odorants. But all this
could reﬂect the relevance of linguistic tags to subjective awareness
of olfactory mental qualities, and not to the mental qualities them-
selves, which are on QST ﬁxed independent of any such subjective
awareness.
Since perceptual acuity increases even for identity and nam-
ing in accordance with familiarity of the odor (Homewood and
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Stevenson, 2001) and practice (Cain, 1979), it is worth consid-
ering how olfactory acuity is mediated by memory. Our almost
pathological inability to name odors (Olofsson et al., 2012) has
led many to question the format of odor memory. The under-
lying mechanisms and processes are still being investigated, but
a growing body of evidence suggests that olfactory memory is
not mediated by linguistic tags or verbal coding. Odor memory
is possible without verbal mediation (Møller et al., 2004). Olfac-
tory coding and experiences are non-linguistically formatted and
do not dependent on language processing (Goodglass et al., 1968;
Herz, 2000). There has been no direct research concerning the
format of non-conscious olfactory mental qualities. However, if
olfactory memory, which is arguably independent of subjective
awareness, does not depend on linguistic tags or verbal coding,
then the QS of olfactory mental qualities, which is also indepen-
dent of subjective awareness, is unlikely to depend on linguistic
tags and verbal reports.
Perfume experts do have enhanced olfactory discriminative
abilities. That enhanced ability might in part be due to increased
descriptive resources or linguistic labels, though the number of
experiences has a much greater inﬂuence (Gilbert et al., 1998).
Perfume experts and novices mostly overlap in their odor catego-
rization, as determined by their sorting of perfumes into groups
based on consciously perceived similarities and differences. The
perfume experts weremore parsimonious in the number of group-
ings, but the difference was not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover,
despite the expert’s more exacting usage of linguistic descriptors
for odor groups, their groupings themselves were mostly similar
to those of the novice consumers. Not only did the perfumers’
enhanced semantic repertoire and linguistic tags show no marked
affect in their categorical groupings of odors, but where they did
differ in similarity judgments, the differences are best explained
by the larger number of times the experts had been previously
exposed to the stimulus (Veramendi et al., 2012). Thus, even the
slight increase of the experts’ parsimony in the number of group-
ings, itself not statistically signiﬁcant, is best attributed to the
number of experiences, rather than linguistic sophistication.
Further support for the idea that stimulus exposure leads to
and is primarily responsible for an increase in olfactory acuity
comes from studies that show that our conscious olfactory dis-
crimination abilities increase with training and exposure. More
familiar odors are easier to discriminate than those that are unfa-
miliar to us (Jehl et al., 1995). Perfume shop workers have an
increased ability to discriminate odors, yet their stimulus detection
threshold and ability to identify odors from a list of descriptors is
not enhanced (Hummel et al., 2004). These results suggest that
peripheral sensory plasticity or increased descriptive resources are
not the determining factor in this increased discriminative ability.
Instead, this increase appears to be driven by some sort of per-
ceptual sensory template. Olfactory memory enables our capacity
for perceptual discrimination in a manner that is not linguisti-
cally driven, yet in perfect keeping with the claim of QST that
perceptual acuity can be improved through a sheer increase in
the number of conscious or unconscious experiences that the
subject undergoes, thereby enhancing our perceptual ability for
making judgments of JND, which results in an enlarged or more
ﬁne-grained QS.
That odor acuity improves with an increase in olfactory expe-
riences and training independent of linguistic mediation has also
been documented in studies of wine experts. Wine experts out-
perform novices at odor discrimination (Solomon, 1990; Melcher
and Schooler, 1996; Bende and Nordin, 1997) and their increased
ability results from greater perceptual skill and not verbal or
descriptive resources (Parr et al., 2002). Parr et al. showed that
the experts had an enhanced ability to recognize odors, but that
they did not outperform novices either in terms of their sensi-
tivity threshold for odorant detection or the verbal memory task.
When this result is combined with their ﬁndings that odor naming
and odor recognition were not positively correlated, it provides
further reason to think that increased olfactory recognition and
discriminative acuity do not depend on an increased availability
of linguistic tags or semantic descriptors.
This does not preclude the possibility that novices are some-
times aided in coming to discriminate odors consciously in more
ﬁne-grained ways by learning new tags or descriptive resources
for distinct mental qualities (Rosenthal, 2005, chapters 1 and 7).
The tags or descriptive resources would be relevant to novices’
subjective awareness of mental qualities, which might well already
differ. Further testing based on subliminal presentation of olfac-
tory stimulus using forced-choice methodology or the equivalent
is needed.
More recently it was shown that wine experts can more accu-
rately discriminated between two varieties of wines as indicated
by their correctly sorting samples into their respective groups
(Ballester et al., 2008). Moreover, these results showed an inter-
subjective convergence of the experts on their judged typicality
of each variety of wine, which the authors interpret as indicating
that the experts discriminated each kind of wine in respect of its
perceptual characteristics. However, these results do not address
the question whether the increased perceptual ability and judg-
ments of typicality are caused by an enhanced perceptual strategy
that is more analytic and focuses upon the perceptible qualities
of the stimulus, as against being due instead to enhanced descrip-
tive repertoire that allows greater conscious discriminative ability.
At least one study suggests that it is the former. In this study,
wine experts were trained to detect and discriminate between
key sensory characteristics using sensory training (Tempere et al.,
2012). By exposing experts to key odorous wine compounds
Tempere et al. increased the experts’ perceptual abilities by low-
ering their detection threshold through increased exposure to the
key compounds in a fashion that only allowed them further dis-
crimination within that group of qualitatively similar perceptible
properties.
Taken together, the results from these studies provide evidence
that olfactory acuity improves with the number of olfactory expe-
riences in a manner that does not depend upon maturation of the
olfactory system or the nature or richness of linguistic represen-
tation of the olfaction qualities. Human discriminative abilities
increase in accordance with the overall perceptual QS of olfaction
that is evidently not mediated by linguistic or verbal coding. In
the wine-training research the overall effect was speciﬁc to the
training stimulus, which indicates that an enhancement of the
olfactory mental-QS is determined by the perceptible properties
we can discriminate among.
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A key test for the claim that olfactory discriminative acuity
is mediated by experience and not linguistic coding or descrip-
tive resources is cross-cultural comparisons of odor perception
and categorization. Linguistic conventions and conceptual nam-
ing strategies differ between cultures, yet there is great overlap
in overall odorant categorization as determined by odorant sort-
ing experiments using consciously judged perceptual similarities
(Chrea et al., 2005a,b). In these studies, American, French, and
Vietnamese students were shown to sort odor samples into simi-
lar groupings that were not consistent with their groupings of the
odor labels that would be associated with the olfactory samples
presented in the odorant sorting task. Since the odorants were
categorized differently from the labels, there is reason to believe
that the verbal labels did not determine odorant grouping. Addi-
tionally, the differences between the different cultural groups in
odor grouping displayed a familiarity effect. Individuals from cul-
tures that were more familiar with an odor categorized it similarly,
thereby showing that the number of exposures was the best indi-
cator of olfactory discriminative ability for odor categorization in
this type of odorant-sorting task.
Experience-dependent olfactory perceptual abilities pose no
problem for QST. However, there is another result that might
at ﬁrst sight seem to do so. Research on olfactory sensitivity,
using classical conditioning, has demonstrated that enantiomers
can be discriminated by subjects despite their subjective reports
that they possess identical olfactory qualities (Li et al., 2008). Li
et al. demonstrated that supraliminally indistinguishable optical
isomers are discriminable after classical conditioning. Accord-
ing to QST, discriminative ability determines mental quality. In
this case there is an increase in discriminative acuity and thus an
enhancement of the olfactory QS in respect of discriminative abil-
ity, yet no subjective report of any increase in perceived olfactory
quality.
But despite initial appearances, this is readily explained by QST,
since the mental qualities that discriminative ability determines on
the theory are independent of any subjective awareness of those
mental qualities. In this case we have increased reﬁnement of
mental qualities that is not reﬂected in a corresponding ability
to distinguish those qualities. Thus in the next section we turn to
non-conscious olfactory qualities and to whether we have good
reason to think there are non-conscious mental qualities corre-
sponding to each of the enantiomers post-conditioning that we
cannot report on.
OLFACTORY QUALITIES IN NON-CONSCIOUS OLFACTORY
STATES
Non-conscious olfactory states that are genuinely qualitativemight
be inferred from the phenomena of blind smell (Schwartz et al.,
1994; Sobel et al., 1999; Schwartz, 2000), mate selection (reviewed
in Wilson and Stevenson, 2006), social acquaintance selection (Li
et al., 2007), and an argument from absence which would explain
the deterioration in quality of life following the onset of anosmia.
Anosmia is the most common disorder of olfactory pathology in
which individuals lose their sense of smell. In some cases anosmia
is due to the presence of a psychological disorder, but the vast
majority of cases result from damage to the olfactory bulb due to
either infection or head trauma. In addition to their inability to
perceive olfactory stimuli, anosmic individuals also experience a
decrease in their hedonic quality of life (Miwa et al., 2001; Keller
and Malaspina, 2013), which in turn is often causally implicated in
the further development of depression (Deems et al., 1991).We are
not aware of our olfactory experiences most of the time, but they
imbue our lives with a qualitative character of experience, which
becomes most striking when it is absent (for a review of all these
phenomena and their relation to other theories of non-conscious
qualitative states, such asBlock,1993,1995,2001,2007,2008,2009)
distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness, see
“smelling phenomenal”byYoung (in press) in this special research
topic.
But a concern regarding each of these phenomena as evidence
for unconscious olfactory qualitative states is that humans are not
commonly aware of their olfactory experience and generally dis-
count their overall olfactory abilities (Sela and Sobel, 2010). So
one might question whether we should conclude, in accordance
with QST, that non-conscious olfactory perceptual states do have
genuine mental qualities.
But it turns out that olfaction can provide independent evi-
dence using secondary processing measures that non-conscious
olfactorydiscriminative abilitymatches that of consciousdiscrimi-
native ability, thereby corroborating the view of QST that olfactory
mental qualities do indeed occur independent of consciousness.
They occur not merely in the absence of attention, but in the
absence of subjective awareness itself.
Secondary processing measures are traditionally employed in
disputes regarding computational implementations of cognitive
abilities; but similar measures are also available in the measur-
ing of perceptual states. In addition to a state’s role in enabling
discrimination of olfactory stimuli and in addition also to any of
distinctive role it may have, there might be other secondary prop-
erties we can use to judge whether or not the same type of state
occurred, utilizing a very similar if not always wholly identical
physical realization. Secondary processes are correlated properties
or incidental effects (Cummins et al., 2001), such as speed, error
rate, types of errors, or fatigue, etc., of a perceptual system in the
performance of particular tasks.
In olfactory research the perceptible property of valence (the
perceived pleasant or unpleasant property of an odor) provides
just such this type of measure for assessing the veridical nature
of this perceived olfactory property, independent of subjective
reports based on conscious awareness. Behavioral measures such
as sniff rate and volume, response time, and heart rate can
all be used as independent measures that indicate the olfac-
tory system is treating pleasant or unpleasant olfactory stimuli
in the same fashion, regardless of whether we consciously per-
ceive the odors or can subjectively report upon their olfactory
qualitative character or their valence. The perceptible property
of olfactory pleasantness or unpleasantness can be employed
using sniff rates as a secondary measure to verify the perceived
pleasantness or unpleasantness of an odor even when the sub-
jects are subjectively unaware of any relevant olfactory mental
qualities.
Humans modulate their sniff rate and volume 150 ms after the
onset of a stimulus depending on the odor’s concentration and
valence (Johnson et al., 2003). The stimulus-dependent response
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of human snifﬁng is such that intense and unpleasant odorant are
sniffed less vigorously and with a decreased volume. Measurement
of olfactory motor responses to odorants is reliable enough to be
used as a non-verbal measure of human’s detection and catego-
rization of the odor (Frank et al., 2003). Additionally, it has been
shown that while individuals with fully functional olfactory sys-
tems modulate their snifﬁng in accordance with the valence of
the odor, anosmics show no such response (Harland and Frank,
1997). This shows that the sniff response only occurs when the
subject perceives the valence of the presented stimulus and can
arguably be used to show that the variable of sniff rates can be
used to demonstrate the occurrence of mental qualities indepen-
dent of conscious subjective reports, and hence in the absence of
subjective awareness.
Sniff rate and volume are not the only secondary mea-
sures for assessing odor valence. Response time is faster in
detection and discrimination tasks for unpleasant odors (Ben-
saﬁ et al., 2003), and heart rate measurements show that we
involuntarily react in distinctive ways to unpleasant odors (Ben-
saﬁ et al., 2002). The subject’s non-conscious perception of
odor valence can be veriﬁed using behavioral non-verbal mea-
sure such as sniff patterns, response time, and physiological
response of heart rate. These measures, and in particular the
invariance of sniff rate between conscious and non-conscious
presentations of an odor, further support QSTs methodology
of identifying mental qualities in light of a state’s perceptual
role in enabling perceptual discriminations, independent of
whether the subject can report undergoing an experience with
qualitative character and so independent of subjective aware-
ness.
The sameness of perceptual role of olfactory states in conscious
and non-conscious olfaction as assessed by the secondary mea-
sures of sniff-rates (as well as other behavioral measures) is what
supports the methodology of inferring sameness of perceptual
content andmental quality. Thus, these secondarymeasures can be
employed as empirically sound tools for verifying the perceptible
property of valence independently of subjective reports.
Secondary processing measures corroborate QSTs conclusion
that occurrence of mental qualities can be established inde-
pendently of subjective awareness. However, further research is
required on the snifﬁng parameters of subjects during judgments
of JNDs, since olfactory imagery generates consciously imagined
percepts. In addition, of the aforementioned phenomena that
provide evidence for non-conscious olfactory states that are gen-
uinely qualitative, only the work of Schwartz et al. (1994) on blind
smell employed a forced-choice discrimination task, but with-
out measurements of snifﬁng patterns. Nonetheless these further
measures provide a promising way to strengthen the extrapola-
tion of the QS of perceptible JNDs to the QS of mental qualities,
since they provide further motivation that the best explanation
must involve the existence of non-conscious mental qualities. The
alternative explanation that non-conscious olfactory states do not
exhibit qualitative character is unmotivated, because behavioral
and physiologically measures can indicate that at least for the per-
ceptible property of valence the olfactory system is treating certain
non-conscious olfactory states as equivalent to those that exhibit
conscious qualitative character.
Even employing secondary measures, the aforementioned Li
et al. (2008) study provides what appears superﬁcially to be a
problem for QST. Their ﬁndings indicate that even though the
subjects can be trained to discriminate between enantiomers with
identical olfactory qualities, the subjects’ ratings of the valence,
intensity, and familiarity of these structures were not affected.
Training might have produced the ability to detect the differ-
ences in the enantiomer’s structure, such that subjects could
discriminate between the enantiomers, but it did not lead to a
reportable change in the qualitative character of the olfactory
quality of the conditioned enantiomer. Furthermore, secondary
processing measures indicate that even after training the percep-
tible properties of each enantiomer remained the same. These
results may seem to run contrary to what QST would predict,
since the increased discriminability should yield further mental
qualities.
However, QST deﬁnes mental qualities independent of con-
scious awareness of olfactory stimuli, in terms simply of discrimi-
native ability, whether conscious or not. So Li et al.’s results do not
after all threaten QST. It is perfectly possible that mental qualities
occur non-consciously in a more ﬁne-grained way than we are
subjectively aware of, and hence in a more ﬁne-grained way than
we can report.
Indeed, as Rosenthal (2005, ch. 7, 2010) has argued, that is
very likely the best explanation for the way novices can quickly
learn to distinguish consciously previously indistinguishable stim-
uli, such as two wines or two musical instruments, when given
terms to attach to the two stimuli. Having distinct terms for the
two experiences, the experiences come to be consciously distinct.
The best explanation is that distinct mental qualities already occur
on tasting the two wines or hearing the two instruments, but only
non-consciously. Learning the new terms facilitates those uncon-
scious mental qualities’ becoming conscious. Li et al.’s fascinating
research on enantiomers would present a challenge to QST only if
the theory implied that discriminative ability in the non-conscious
case is always matched in the conscious case. But the theory does
not imply that, and indeed implies that the opposite is likely.
CONCLUSION
QST ﬁxes and describes the mental qualities for each percep-
tual modality by appeal to the discriminative ability that yields
JNDs, independent of whether the relevant perceptual states are
conscious. Such JNDs among perceptible properties allow the con-
struction of a QS of those properties. Because the perceptual states
that discriminate perceptible properties differ in mental quality, a
QS of discriminable perceptible properties serves also to ﬁx the
mental qualities that are operative in such discrimination.
The construction of a QS for the visual mental qualities is rel-
atively straightforward. The construction of a QS that would do
justice to olfactory stimuli, however, poses special challenges. This
is due in part to the vastly greater number of olfactory discrimina-
tions we can make compared to those we can make, for example,
among visible stimuli. The challenge for constructing an olfactory
QS becomes especially formidable in connection with mixtures of
olfactory stimuli. Because of these and related factors, the olfactory
QS will inevitably have a huge number of dimensions. Nonethe-
less, there is no reason to doubt that a QS can be constructed that
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would capture the ability to discriminate among olfactory stim-
uli, and thereby the olfactory mental qualities that underlie that
ability.
A question arises also about what distinguishes olfactory stim-
uli from stimuli of other types and, more generally, about how
to distinguish each perceptual modality from others. It turns out
that QST helps here as well; the same appeal to discriminative
ability that ﬁxes the mental qualities can be harnessed to dis-
tinguish the various modalities. This way of distinguishing the
modalities, moreover, is arguably superior to more traditional
ways of doing so. And the QS methodology has the additional
beneﬁt of allowing a QS treatment of mental qualities that ﬁgure
speciﬁcally in the sensing of location, as well as perceptible size
and shape for those modalities that enable the discrimination
of those spatial perceptible properties. Moreover, it provides the
tools to conﬁrm just which spatial properties each modality can
discriminate.
QST accommodates the perceptual learning and maturation
known to occur with olfaction and other modalities. Such pro-
cesses result in the enhancement of the relevant QS, either by
expanding it or by increasing its ﬁneness of grain. This applies
both to conscious changes in olfactory discriminative ability and
to non-conscious development. But it is likely that an increased
linguistic repertoire for olfactory experiences and the acquisition
of new linguistic tags to refer to them enhances the waywe are con-
sciously aware of olfactory stimuli, but not the underlying ability
to discriminate among olfactory stimuli. QST predicts this, since
it ﬁxes mental qualities independent of their being conscious and
also independent of such linguistic tags and repertoire.
QST proceeds independently of whether the mental qualities
are conscious because the theory ﬁxes and describes mental qual-
ities by their role in discriminating among barely discriminable
stimuli, and such discriminations occur both consciously and not.
Mental qualities are posited to explain the differences among per-
ceptual states that enable such discriminations, whether or not
those discriminations are conscious. In the conscious case, there
is in addition ﬁrst-person access to those mental qualities, but
QST ﬁxes the mental qualities solely by their role in discrimi-
nation, independent of such ﬁrst-person access. So the theory
readily accommodatesmental qualities that are not conscious. And
olfaction provides compelling independent corroboration of non-
conscious olfactory mental qualities by appeal to the secondary
processing measures of non-conscious olfactory perception.
In conclusion, QST provides a powerful theoretical tool for the
understanding and the scientiﬁc study of olfactory mental quali-
ties and olfactory perception. Olfaction in turn provides further
evidence in support of QST, which has now been shown to be
consistent with empirical ﬁndings in different modalities.
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